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Abstract 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 
significantly expanded the exemptions from the normal workings of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we study investors’ reaction to news about the 
promulgation of the BAPCPA repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions and the influence extending such 
exemptions to repos collateralized by riskier collateral had on equity market information 
asymmetry. We find a negative market reaction to news events about the promulgation of 
BAPCPA, which subsequent cross-sectional analysis suggests is at least partly driven by repo 
exposure. This finding suggests that investors perceived the increase in finance risk from the 
extension of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions as dominating the perceived gain from accessing 
cheaper finance. Further, we find that the promulgation of BAPCPA gave rise to increased 
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The impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 Repo ‘Safe harbor’ 
provisions on investors 
 
1. Introduction 
We analyze the equity market reaction to the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 and banks’ market information 
asymmetry following the extension of the “safe harbor” provisions to repurchase agreements 
(repos) collateralized by risky assets. ‘For most financial institutions that actively trade in the 
debt markets on a day-to-day basis, cash needs are met by borrowing through repurchase 
agreements’ (Krishnamurthy 2010, 8). This establishes the repo market as one of the main 
sources for the provision of short-term wholesale funding. Given insufficient information about 
bilateral repo agreements, there are no estimates of the actual size of the total U.S. repo market. 
Rough estimates of the amount of repo transactions entered by U.S. primary dealers suggest 
that repos are a significant source of finance. Specifically, data derived from Federal Reserve’s 
Form FR 2004, suggests that in 2015 U.S. primary dealers1 entered around $2.2 trillion of repos 
(Baklanova 2015). 
The importance and growth of the repo market can at least be partly attributed to its 
preferential treatment under bankruptcy law, resulting from the so-called ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions. These provisions which first appeared for repo agreements in the 1984 amendments 
                                                          
1 As of August 2015, the following institutions were designated as primary dealers: Bank of Nova Scotia, New 
York Agency, BMO Capital Markets Corp., BNP Paribas Securities Corp., Barclays Capital Inc., Cantor 
Fitzgerald & Co., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Daiwa Capital Markets 
America Inc., Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Goldman, Sachs & Co., HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., Jefferies LLC, 
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Mizuho Securities USA Inc., 
Morgan Stanley & Co.LLC, Nomura Securities International, Inc., RBC Capital Markets, LLC, RBS Securities 
Inc., SG Americas Securities, LLC, TD Securities (USA) LLC, and UBS Securities LLC. 
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to the Bankruptcy Code2 ‘exempt the bankrupt debtor’s financial-contract counterparties from 
the base rules that halt creditor collection efforts when the bankruptcy begins, and claw back 
preferential and fraudulent pre-bankruptcy transfers that harm creditors overall, thus 
facilitating an orderly liquidation or reorganization’ (Morrison et al. 2014, 1016). As further 
discussed in the following sections, over the years these exemptions have been extended to 
encompass a variety of repo agreements.  
Previous research has raised various concerns about the repo market with Gorton and 
Metrick (2010) describing the recent financial crisis as a ‘run on repo’. In this regard, ‘lenders 
of funds, worried about the value of collateral as well as the credit risk of counterparties, 
became increasingly concerned about losses on repurchase agreements’ (Fleming et al. 2009, 
2). In view of this, various authors have questioned whether repo agreement ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions have exacerbated the run on the repo market and whether thus, such exemptions 
should at least be narrowed (e.g. Lubben 2009; Roe 2011; Duffie and Skeel 2012).  
Similarly, various authors have questioned whether the accounting for such transactions 
is adequate (Chircop et al. 2012) and whether disclosures on such transactions adequately 
inform shareholders about the riskiness of these transactions. In this regard, Adrian et al. (2012) 
conclude that it is particularly difficult to determine the risks arising from repo transactions 
entered by a specific firm. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has recently 
noted stakeholder concern ‘about the need to improve existing disclosure requirements for 
repurchase agreements, linking those needs to the credit crisis and the need to better understand 
the nature of these transactions, the use of funding obtained through these transactions, and the 
associated credit and liquidity risks’ (FASB 2013). 
                                                          
2 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 extended ‘safe harbor’ provisions to repo 
agreements. This bill was signed into law on July 10, 1984. 
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To explore the effect of ‘safe harbor’ exemptions on shareholders and on the 
overarching information asymmetries that plagues repos we focus on a particular amendment 
to the US bankruptcy statute brought about by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Act of 2005. This Act significantly increased the array of repo 
agreements which could avail of the ‘safe harbor’ exemptions. Particularly the Act makes repos 
collateralized by risky collateral, such as mortgage backed securities, eligible for such 
exemptions. By expanding the scope of the ‘safe harbor’ exemptions, the Bankruptcy Code 
makes this source of financing more attractive to companies. Therefore, the BAPCPA 
exemptions likely resulted in a substitution effect where long-term sources of finance are 
substituted by cheaper short-term repo agreements. Exploiting this change in regulation, we 
analyze investor market reaction to news about the promulgation of the BAPCPA and the 
resulting changes in bank information asymmetry.  
We acknowledge that the BAPCPA made several significant changes to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code including to force borrowers to move from Chapter 7, bankruptcy filing, to 
Chapter 11, reorganization. However, prior literature (e.g. Ayotte and Skeel 2013; Duffie and 
Skeel 2012; Infante 2012; Roe and Tung 2013) purports that the new rules on repo transactions 
included in the Act played a particularly important role and deeply affected the banking sector. 
One of the challenges to our empirical analyses consists in isolating the impact of the 
repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions from the impact of other contemporaneous regulatory changes 
introduced by the BAPCPA on investor market reaction. To mitigate such concern, we 
benchmark our results to banks without any repo exposure and control for several bank specific 
characteristics that likely affect repo exposure. These analyses are particularly important in our 
research design since they allow us to link the investors’ market reaction to the bank’s repo 
exposure, thereby providing some confidence that the market effect documented throughout 
the paper is not capturing a general effect due to the introduction of the BAPCPA. 
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The widening of the repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions likely influences investor market 
reaction because of two offsetting factors. The substitution of long-term financing with cheaper 
shorter-term collateralized financing reduces bank finance costs and should be perceived 
positively by shareholders (finance cost factor). Offsetting this effect is the increased finance 
risk3 the company exposes itself to by substituting stable long-term sources of finance with 
mostly overnight repo agreements. This is likely to be perceived negatively by shareholders 
(finance risk factor). In our analyses, we find negative market reactions to news about the 
promulgation of the BAPCPA suggesting that the finance risk factor dominates any benefit 
derived from the reduction in finance costs. A common limitation of such event studies is the 
identification of a control group to control for confounding events not related to the regulatory 
change under study. To address this limitation, we use banks without any repo exposure during 
our sample period as our control and find that the observed negative market reaction is 
statistically significant for banks with repo exposure only. While such an analysis allows us to 
control for confounding events, there is still the possibility that the observed results are due to 
the effect of changes in bankruptcy law on bank characteristics correlated with repo exposure. 
To control for such possibility, in subsequent cross-sectional analyses we control for firm 
characteristics which prior literature have shown to be related to repo exposure and, find that 
the previously observed market reaction is at least partly driven by repo exposure.  
Given that the widening of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions brought about by the BAPCPA 
expanded the heterogeneity of repo transactions, and this change was not accompanied by 
enhanced disclosures, it is likely that it caused an increase in market information asymmetry. 
We measure information asymmetry using equity market bid-ask spreads. Using a difference-
                                                          
3 Finance risk is sometimes referred to as roll-over risk. It is the risk that repo financing is not rolled over on 
maturity. Moreover, repos expose companies to counterparty risk. This risk refers to the possibility that the 




in-differences approach, which controls for heterogeneity in the sampled banks, we find that 
following the enactment of the BAPCPA of 2005 the bid-ask spreads increased for banks with 
repo exposure when compared to a control group of banks with no repo exposure. To increase 
the likelihood that the treatment group is orthogonal with respect to the outcome variable we 
identify banks involved in repo transactions before the passage of the BAPCPA of 2005 and 
use banks that were not involved in repo transactions before and after the passage of the 
BAPCPA of 2005 as our control group. Moreover, we undertake tests to show that the treated 
and control groups satisfy the parallel trend assumption prior to the enactment of the BAPCPA 
of 2005. Finally, we employ bank fixed effects to mitigate concerns about the heterogeneity 
between banks with repo and without repo transactions.4  
Our paper contributes to two streams of literature. First, we contribute to the literature 
analyzing the effects of the BAPCPA of 2005 expansion of the repo agreements ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions. While the repercussions of such changes on the incentives of creditors and on the 
functionality of the normal Bankruptcy Code procedures have been thoroughly discussed (e.g. 
Lubben 2009; Roe 2011; Duffie and Skeel 2012), this is to our knowledge the first study that 
examines the economic consequences of this change in bankruptcy law from a shareholder 
perspective. Specifically, to assess whether the expected benefits of the new regulation were 
outweighed by unexpected costs due to finance risk we study shareholder reaction to events 
leading to the propagation of the BAPCPA, and capital market effects in the aftermath of the 
BAPCPA becoming effective. Secondly, we add to the literature on the effects of the BAPCPA 
by showing that the increased heterogeneity of repurchase agreements arising from the 
widening of the type of collateral exempted from the ‘automatic stay’ gave rise to increased 
                                                          
4 We acknowledge that the ideal control group for our difference-in-differences analysis would be composed of 
banks to which all regulations except for the BAPCPA regulations relating to repo transactions apply. This control 




information asymmetry. This is an important unintended capital market effect of the BAPCPA 
arising from changes in the legal framework which are not accompanied by changes in the 
disclosure requirements set out in accounting regulation. In this way, we add to the literature 
examining the consequences of asynchronous changes in company regulations and we 
contribute to prior research that highlights the necessity of close coordination between different 
sets of accounting and bank regulation (e.g. Cerbioni et al. 2015; Fabrizi and Parbonetti 2015). 
We feel that this is the main policy implication of our study. 
This study is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the institutional background and 
discusses extant literature relevant to this study. Section 3 discusses the major congressional 
news events leading to the passage of the BAPCPA of 2005 while Section 4 sets out our 
hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the research design, sample and empirical results relating to 
the market event and subsequent cross-sectional analyses. Similarly, Section 6 discusses the 
research design, sample and empirical results relating to the information asymmetry analyses. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. Background and Literature Review 
2.1. Institutional background  
Repos are two-legged transactions which combine a spot market sale with a 
simultaneous forward agreement to repurchase the underlying instrument at a later date, often 
the next day (Duffie 1996, 497). The party undertaking the spot market sale of the underlying 
instruments is said to be entering into a repo transaction, while the party purchasing the 
underlying instruments while simultaneously agreeing ‘to resell the same or equivalent 
securities at a specific price at a later date’ (Ong and Yeung 2011), is said to be undertaking a 
reverse repo transaction. Moreover, since each leg of the transaction is a true sale, it is often5 
                                                          
5 Sometimes provisions are inserted in the repurchase agreement which prohibits the sale and/or rehypothecation 
of the collateral to third parties.  
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the case that the party acquiring the underlying financial instruments may sell or rehypothecate 
such collateral to third parties.  
The repo market plays an important role in the efficient allocation of capital (Fleming 
et al. 2009). Banks and dealers ‘use repurchase transactions to finance inventories, to cover 
short positions, to create leverage and to hedge or speculate on interest rate movements’ while 
pension funds and insurance companies use repos ‘to invest surplus cash, to earn incremental 
returns on their portfolios or to raise cash for investment’ (Hördahl and King 2008, 38).  
In 2005 when the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) was signed into law, accounting for repurchase agreements was regulated by SFAS 
1406 which set out the repo transaction disclosure requirements in §17 (FASB 2000). SFAS 
140 required an entity entering into a repo agreement: 
1) to disclose ‘its policy for requiring collateral or other security’; 
2)  ‘if the entity has pledged any of its assets as collateral that are not reclassified and 
separately reported in the statement of financial position…’ it should disclose ‘…the carrying 
amounts and classifications of those assets as of the date of the latest statement of financial 
position presented’; 
3) ‘if the entity has accepted collateral that is permitted by contract or custom to sell or 
repledge, the fair value as of the date of each statement of financial position presented of that 
collateral and of the portion of that collateral that it has sold or repledged, and information 
about the sources and use of that collateral’ (FASB 2000 §17). 
                                                          
6 SFAS 140, ‘Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities’ was 
issued in September 2000. It was amended by SFAS 166 (FASB, 2009) ‘Accounting for Transfers of Financial 
Assets an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140’ and more recently FASB issued Accounting Standard Updated 
(ASU) 2014-11 Transfers and Servicing (Topic 860) (FASB,2014) ‘Repurchase-to Maturity Transactions, 
Repurchase Financings, and Disclosures’ which expand disclosures on repurchase agreements.  
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The significance of the repo market as a source of short-term funding for banks and the 
fact that the repo market is opaque to most financial statement users makes disclosures about 
banks’ exposure to the repo market especially important for financial statement users to be able 
to price bank risk.  
2.2 Literature review 
One of the most important objectives of Bankruptcy legislation is to set priority rules, 
which are central to business reorganizations. Specifically, based on these rules value is 
distributed among creditors by the bankrupt firm. The importance of such rules is highlighted 
by the fact that a firm in bankruptcy lacks sufficient value to honor all its obligations, and thus 
priority rules ultimately determine which of the firm creditors are to be paid (Roe and Tung 
2013).  
The importance of such priority rules, have resulted in different creditors, among which 
parties to the repo market, lobbying the U.S. Congress to achieve super-priority in bankruptcy 
proceedings. This super-priority alters bankruptcy distributions, where payment to certain 
creditors is prioritized to the detriment of other firm creditors. Specifically, the Bankruptcy 
Code exemption of repos from automatic stay incentivizes creditors supplying collateralized 
loans to undertake repo agreements. Indeed, while the automatic stay typically prohibits the 
immediate liquidation of the collateral in favor of the loan, repos are exempt from such stay 
and thus repo creditors can in the event of a bankruptcy event, immediately liquidate any 
collateral (Ibid.). In other words, such exemption allows for the resolution of repo obligations 
out of the bankruptcy court proceedings. 
The primary argument for the introduction of these exemptions is that the repo market 
is major source of systemic risk and that such exemptions help in reducing such risk (Bliss and 
Kaufman 2006). Systemic risk is the risk that major financial institutions fail at the same time 
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resulting in market illiquidity. The costs and benefits of these exemptions have been the subject 
of various studies. For example, Edwards and Morrison (2005) examine the effect the 
exemptions from ‘automatic stay’ afforded to derivative and repo contracts had on the collapse 
of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in the Fall of 1998. They conclude 
that the exemptions afforded to derivative and repo contracts by the Bankruptcy Code not only 
failed to reduce systemic risk, but exacerbated such risk, forcing the Federal Reserve to 
intervene and support LTCM. Specifically, the authors suggest that in a forced liquidation, the 
exemption of derivative and repo contract counterparties from ‘automatic stay’ would have 
enabled these counterparties to close-out and seize LTCM assets to the detriment of other 
creditors. This “would not only have [had] a significant distorting impact on market prices, but 
also in the process could produce large losses – or worse – for a number of creditors and 
counterparties, and for other market participants who were not directly involved with LTCM...” 
(Greenspan 1998).   
More recently, Roe (2011) examines the failure of AIG, Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers within the ambit of the exemptions afforded by the Bankruptcy Code to derivative 
and repo counterparties. By exempting derivative and repo counterparties from the normal 
bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Code gives preference to these parties over other 
creditors. Such preference waters down the market discipline incentives for prioritized 
creditors and enhances the market discipline incentives for nonprioritized creditors. 
Notwithstanding this, nonprioritized creditors, such as the US tax payer, are poorly positioned 
to replicate the degree of counterparty market discipline that would have been afforded by 
prioritized creditors. The author concludes that the reduced incentives for repo counterparties 
to monitor their debtors likely contributed to the recent collapse of major financial institutions. 
Preferential treatment of repo counterparties also contributes to the inefficient 
substitution of funding away from traditional sources of finance (Duffie and Skeel 2012). This 
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cost stems from the fact that the exemption from automatic stay makes short term repo 
financing cheaper when compared to traditional finance. Indeed, suppliers of traditional finance 
will likely charge higher interest rates than repo finance in response to the increase default 
losses arising from the loss of priority to repos (Bolton and Oehmke 2015). Such a cost is 
particularly pertinent, given that repo financing is a fragile source of finance, typically 
consisting of transactions with overnight maturities which must be rolled over every day. Given 
this, such financing might easily be withdrawn by counterparties (Gorton and Metrick 2012).  
Besides the above mentioned costs, the repo exemption from automatic stay also has a 
number of benefits, the most sizeable of which is that it discourages repo counterparties from 
running on the firm as soon as the firm’s financial condition is suspect. This given that the repo 
exemption from automatic stay gives added flexibility to repo counterparties to quickly exit a 
repo agreement, even after the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings (Duffie and Skeel 2012).  
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, 
the legislation at the center of this study and which we discuss further in the next section, 
expanded the range of repurchase agreements that could avail from the exemption from 
automatic stay. There is a paucity of literature examining the effect of the BAPCPA at the firm 
level. An exception to this, is Ganduri (2017) who studies the impact of the 2005 bankruptcy 
reform act on mortgage origination by Mortgage Companies (IMCs). The study finds that post-
BAPCPA, IMCs increased the issuance of risky mortgages which ultimately resulted in an 
increase in ex-post defaults. The author attributes this IMC response to the availability of 
cheaper finance resulting from the increased creditor protection offered by the BAPCPA. Our 
study complements Ganduri (2017) by examining the equity market effects of BAPCPA. While 
prior literature discussed previously has looked at the effects of changes in bankruptcy statute 
on financial institutions and their creditors, we are the first to examine the impact of the 
BAPCPA on investors. Examining the effect of the BAPCPA on the equity market is 
11 
 
particularly important given that the equity market consists of public banks’ ultimate owners, 
the shareholders. 
3. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 
2005 
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) significantly altered the US bankruptcy statue. Among other changes, by widening 
the array of repos that could take advantage of the ‘safe harbor’ exemptions, this legislation 
significantly altered the functioning of the US repo market. In Section 3.1 we provide a detailed 
overview of the effect of the BAPCPA on the repo market while in Section 3.2 we list the main 
events leading to the enactment of the BAPCPA. 
 
3.1 The effect of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) of 2005 on the repo market 
A repo is a hybrid contract between a sale of securities and a secured loan (Stigum 
1989). In the past, this hybrid nature led to uncertainty about whether the automatic stay should 
be applied if a repo borrower files for bankruptcy. In 1982, in the case of Lombard-Wall the 
court ruled that the securities purchased in a repo transaction were subject to the automatic 
stay. The sentence was contrary to market expectations and Stigum (1989, 219) quotes a market 
participant who said that the sentence “scared the hell out of the industry”. As a consequence 
of the Lombard-Wall case, there was an effort to change the Bankruptcy Code exempting repo 
collateral from automatic stay. The Treasury department did not champion this change arguing 
that the exemption from automatic stay would reduce the oversight incentive of repo lenders 
over repo borrowers. However, in 1984 the Bankruptcy Code was amended providing a ‘safe 
harbor’ (the exemption from the automatic stay) to repos collateralized by treasury and agency 
securities, bank certificates of deposits and banker’s acceptances. 
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In the mid ‘90s repo financing was extended to riskier and non-traditional collateral 
such as mortgage backed securities and asset backed securities (Acharya et al. 2010). However, 
given that only “traditional” securities were exempted from automatic stay “repo contracts 
were written to represent the transaction as a true sale, so that if the borrower filed for 
bankruptcy, the lender could retain the possession of the securities” (Maclachlan 2014, 519). 
However, another court sentence ruling the bankruptcy of Criimi Mae in 2002 surprised market 
participants creating uncertainty in the repo market (Schroeder 2002). The court sentenced that 
the repo used by Criimi Mae was equivalent to a secured loan and that the collateral was not 
exempted from automatic stay. Similar to Lombard-Wall, this case, gave new impetus to amend 
the Bankruptcy Code to widen the ‘safe-harbor’ provision to include non-traditional securities. 
Indeed, the BAPCPA of 2005 widened the range of ‘safe-harbored’ repos. In this respect §907 
of the BAPCPA amended the definition of repurchase agreement in paragraph 47, Title 11, of 
the US Bankruptcy Code to include transfers of the following instruments: 
• Mortgage related securities (as defined in Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). 
• Mortgage loans. 
• Interests in mortgage related securities or mortgage loans. 
• Qualified foreign government securities (defined as a security that is a direct obligation 
of, or that is fully guaranteed by, the central government of a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).7 
The relevant Bankruptcy Code procedures which allow repurchase agreement 
counterparties exemptions from the normal bankruptcy proceedings are §559 which exempt 
repo agreement counterparties from the automatic stay, §362(b)(7) and §362(o), ‘which protect 
                                                          




repo counterparties’ setoff rights and their rights to realize against margin or other collateral 
posted by the debtor’ (Morrison et al. 2014, 1022) thus buttressing the exemption from 
automatic stay set out in §559, and §546(f) and §548(d) “which shield repo counterparties from 
preferential or fraudulent transfer actions seeking to recover margin, settlement, or other 
payments made in connection with repo agreements” (Ibid., 1022). 
3.2 News Events Leading To The Passage Of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
And Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) Of 2005 
The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 was a highly 
controversial piece of legislation which makes the most significant changes to the Bankruptcy 
Code since its enactment in 1978 (Benton, 2005). The main driver for the passage of this bill 
was the perceived ease by which petitioners (in particular individuals) could apply for and 
initiate bankruptcy procedures. “In 1979… debtors filed 225,000 individual petitions. By 2004, 
filings increased dramatically to more than 1.5 million petitions” (Ibid, CC1). In this regard, 
the main goal of the BAPCPA of 2005 was to prevent perceived abuse of the bankruptcy 
provisions by enforcing means testing and promoting credit counselling to incentivize 
borrowers with the ability to repay to move from Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing to Chapter 11 
reorganization.  
Given the controversial nature of this Act, its enactment was a long difficult process 
which saw its beginning in 1997 when it was first drafted. In December 2000, both Congress 
and the House of Representatives approved an amended draft titled Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
2000, however President Clinton employed a ‘pocket veto’ and left this bill unsigned 
(Riechmann 2000).  
From 2000 to 2005 there were various attempts to pass amended forms of this 
legislation through Congress but it was only on February 1, 2005 that the bill in its current 
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format was introduced as S.256 in the Senate by Republican Senator Charles Grassely of Iowa 
in his name and that of seven original cosponsors. On February 9, 2005 the Chairman of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., for himself and 60 other 
cosponsors introduced an identical bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 685). On March 
10, 2005 the bill was passed through the Senate by a vote of 74 in favor and 25 against (Record 
Vote No.:44) and was subsequently passed through the House of Representatives on April 14, 
2005 by a vote of 302 in favor and 126 against (Roll No.108). The bill was signed into law by 
President Bush on April 20, 2005 and most of its provisions took effect on October 17, 2005 
(Dickerson, 2006). 8 
<<Insert table 1 about here>> 
4. Hypotheses Development 
4.1.  Market Reaction 
The market reaction to news about the passage of the BAPCPA depends on the 
weighting bank shareholders place on two offsetting effects. As suggested by Duffie and Skeel 
(2012) an expansion of the type of collateral that could be used in repurchase agreements to 
avail from the ‘safe harbor’ provisions is likely to facilitate financing through the repo market 
thus facilitating firm growth. Moreover, given that the ‘safe harbor’ provisions for repo 
agreements essentially give preferential treatment to the repo market when compared to other 
funding markets, it is likely that financing through the repo market is cheaper than sourcing 
financing through other markets (Roe 2011; Duffie and Skeel 2012). These factors likely 
contributed to the continuing growth in the repo market as evident in Figure 1. Considering 
                                                          
8 Vide Table 1 for the major Congressional events in 2005 that led to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005. 
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these effects, we would expect equity market participants to have viewed news about the 
passage of the BAPCPA positively. We call this effect the finance cost factor. 
<<Insert Figure 1 about here>> 
The finance cost factor is likely offset by the finance risk factor. The latter factor arises 
from the incentive provided by the BAPCPA to substitute more stable long-term financing with 
short-term runnable repo financing (Duffie and Skeel 2012). In a similar vein, given that 
lenders have a preference to provide longer-term financing against higher quality collateral and 
that the widening of the scope of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions set out by the BAPCPA facilitate 
the use of riskier collateral, it is likely that the BAPCPA resulted in an incentive to substitute 
term repo with overnight repo transactions (Gorton and Metrick 2012). As shown in Figure 2, 
after the BAPCPA became effective overnight repos comprised an increasing percentage of 
total repos. As shown in Figure 3 this is possibly due to the increasing use of riskier collateral 
in repo transactions following the promulgation of the BAPCPA. Such changes in the financing 
arrangements of banks likely increase bank finance risk (Gorton and Metrick 2009; 2012). The 
market perception that the promulgation of the BAPCPA will increase bank finance risk would 
give rise to a negative market reaction to any news increasing the probability of the passage of 
the BAPCPA. 
<<Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here>> 
It is unclear what weighting investors attribute to each factor. Market participants 
attributing a higher weighting to the finance cost factor would have a positive market reaction 
to news increasing the probability of enacting the BAPCPA. Conversely, we would expect 
negative reactions to these news events if investors attribute a higher weight to the finance risk 
factor. Given that ex-ante we do not have a prediction as to which factor will dominate we 
express our first hypothesis in its null form: 
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H1: There is no equity market reaction to news about the passage of the BAPCPA. 
4.2 Information Asymmetry 
There is a rich literature examining the role of company disclosures in mitigating the 
agency conflict between shareholders and management (Leftwich 1980; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986; Beaver 1998).  Specifically, this literature finds that “financial reporting 
and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm 
performance and governance to outside investors” (Healy and Palepu 2001, 405). Since the 
widening of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions to different types of collateral likely expanded the 
heterogeneity of repo transactions, and this change was not accompanied by enhanced 
disclosures about the type of repo transactions undertaken by banks, we posit that the BAPCPA 
caused an increase in equity market information asymmetry. We express our second hypothesis 
as follows:  
H2: The BAPCPA increased equity market information asymmetry for banks 
undertaking repurchase agreements. 
5. Market reaction  
5.1 Variable measurement and research design 
Our study infers investor perceptions to the BAPCPA by examining equity market 
reactions to events leading to the promulgation of the said regulation. In this respect, we follow 
a similar approach to prior studies which have examined investor perceptions to new 
regulations. This approach entails first determining the abnormal return for a three-day event 
window using a multifactor model controlling for market returns and change in treasury rates, 
and subsequently regressing this abnormal return on firm specific characteristics to determine 
which firm characteristics explain the observed abnormal returns. Prior literature using a 
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similar approach to ours include Beatty et al. (1996) who study investor perceptions to the 
promulgation of fair value accounting; Dechow et al. (1996) who study investor perceptions to 
stock based compensation accounting; Jain and Rezaee (2006), Zhang (2007) and Li et al. 
(2008) who study investor perceptions to the Sarbanes Oxley Act and Armstrong et al. (2010) 
who study investor perceptions to the adoption of IFRSs in Europe.  
Though popular in prior literature there are various alternatives to the methodology used 
in this study. For example Brown and Warner (1980) have proposed the following three 
different methods how to calculate abnormal returns when event dates are known: 1) mean 
adjusted returns, 2) market adjusted returns and 3) market and risk adjusted returns. Dyckman 
et al. (1984) and Brown and Warner (1985) assess the accuracy of these different event study 
methodologies when daily returns are used and find that the different measures of abnormal 
returns perform similarly. Chandra et al. (1990) re-examine the Brown and Warner (1985) 
results and conclude that the market- and market-and risk- adjusted return methodology 
perform better than the mean-adjusted return methodology. They conclude that the strong 
performance of the mean-adjusted return methodology in the Brown and Warner (1985) study 
is a statistical artifact. Finally, Brown and Weinstein (1985) examine abnormal returns 
produced using multifactor models and conclude that multifactor models perform better than 
the one factor market model provided that the multifactor model is correctly specified. Given 
the above literature, Binder (1998, 122) concludes that if the sample consists of firms from 
unrelated industries, the one factor market model “works at least as well as the alternatives”. 
Given that the sample for this study consists exclusively of banks, we calculate abnormal 
returns using a multifactor model which apart from controlling for market returns, also controls 
for changes in interest rates. For the banking industry, a change in interest rates has a direct 
impact on what banks charge borrowers and what banks pay for funding (Noonan, 2017).      
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Another alternative to the Beatty et al. (1996) model would be an event study that 
computes cumulative abnormal returns around each event date and then regresses the abnormal 
returns for each event date separately on a vector of explanatory variables. This approach 
assumes that the event dates are independent of each other, and that different firm 
characteristics drive the abnormal returns observed on different event dates. We used the Beatty 
et al. (1996) approach because in our setting we have multiple event dates, all related to the 
enactment of the BAPCPA. In this ambit, the Beatty et al. (1996) methodology allows us to 
identify the bank characteristic which is on average driving abnormal returns for all the 
identified event dates.  
In the first set of tests we investigate our first research hypothesis concerning the market 
reaction around news events that led to the passage of the BAPCPA. To do so, we begin with 
a multifactor model in which firm-specific returns are regressed on market return, on a variable 
capturing interest rate changes, and on an event indicator variable. The event indicator variable 
allows for mean shifts in returns on event days. For each company i, the following process is 
assumed to hold: 
 
RETit = β1 + β2MKT_RETt + β3 CHG_TREASt + β4 EVENT_ALLt + εit               
 (1) 
RET is daily stock price return for firm i in day t, MKT_RET is CRSP equally-weighted 
daily return, CHG_TREAS is the daily change in the Barclays US treasury index, and 
EVENT_ALL is an indicator variable that tags the event days listed in Table 1. We use a three-
day event window9 to test for nonzero excess returns for the events listed in Table 1, i.e., the 
variable EVENT_ALL assumes a value of 1 on the day preceding, the day of, and the day after 
                                                          
9 The use of three-day event windows is well established in the literature. For example, Bushee and Goodman 




the event dates (where days are defined as CRSP trading days). The sign and statistical 
significance of β4 captures the average abnormal returns arising from events related to the 
passage of the BAPCPA.  
Given that any observed market reactions in Equation 1 might be due to confounding 
events unrelated to the widening of the repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions, in subsequent analysis 
we use banks without repo exposure as our control group by interacting EVENT_ALL with an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank had any repo exposure during our 
sample period, and 0 otherwise. Such an approach allows us to control for any other changes 
implemented by BAPCPA which affect banks, but which are unrelated to repo exposure.  
Even though the above approach allows us to control for confounding events, there is 
still the possibility that the observed market reactions are driven by other bank characteristics 
correlated with repo exposure. This concern is particularly pertinent given that as previously 
discussed the BAPCPA introduced significant changes in both personal and corporate 
bankruptcy law. To address this concern, we examine cross-sectional determinants of event 
market reactions. This test is based on the premise that the REPO variable is orthogonal to 
changes brought about by the BAPCPA except for the widening of repo ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions. To do so, we use a two-stage regression where in the first stage, we run Equation 1 
for each bank in our sample over the sample period and in the second stage we regress the firm-
specific coefficient obtained on the dummy EVENT_ALL, on a vector of bank characteristics 
to control for the heterogeneity of our sampled banks. Thus, Equation 2 is: 
 
BETAi = β1 + β2REPOi+ β3REV_REPOi + β4MKT_VALi + β5DERIVi + β6LOANS_REALi + 
β7LOANS_DEPi + β8LOANS_AGRICi + β9LOANS_COMMi + β10LOANS_INDi + 





This equation is a purely cross-sectional test, where BETA is the firm-specific 
coefficient obtained on the indicator variable EVENT_ALL when estimating Equation 1 for 
each sampled bank and the explanatory variables are the mean values over the sample period. 
REPO is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank engages in repo 
transactions, 0 otherwise; REV_REPO is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
bank engages in reverse repo transactions, 0 otherwise;10 MKT_VAL is the logarithm of market 
capitalization that controls for size; DERIV is the amount of derivatives; LOANS_REAL is the 
amount of loans secured by real estate; LOANS_DEP is the amount of loans to depository 
institutions; LOANS_AGRIC is the amount of loans to finance agricultural production; 
LOANS_COMM is the amount of commercial and industrial loans; LOANS_IND is the amount 
of loans to individuals; LOANS_FOREIGN is the amount of loans to foreign governments; SI 
is securitization income11; NI is net income12 and CAPITAL_RATIO is the bank’s capital ratio13. 
All continuous variables with the exception of MKT_VAL and CAPITAL_RATIO are scaled by 
total assets. Further, all variables are computed as the average of the figures for the quarter 
ending December 31, 2004 and the quarter ending March 31, 2005. In order to control for the 
effect of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.14  
In addition to Equation 2 we also implement the approach suggested by Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986). This methodology gives coefficients equal to the two-stage regression but 
yields valid standard errors since it accounts for heteroskedasticity and residual cross-
correlation which arise when events impact all sampled firms at the same time. Specifically, 
the two-stage regression model assumes homoscedasticity of residuals and the absence of 
                                                          
10 Another approach is to include net repurchase agreement (calculated as the difference between REPO and 
REV_REPO) instead of including REPO and REV_REPO separately in our model. While such an approach would 
allow us to measure the association between net repo exposure and market reaction, it would average out the 
magnitude and direction of the association between both repo measures and the market reaction. 
11 Variable bhckb493 of the FRY-9C statements 
12 Variable  bhck4340 of the FRY-9C statements 
13 Variable  bhck7205 of the FRY-9C statements 
14 In untabulated results we obtain the same inferences when we run the analyses without winsorizing the data.  
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contemporaneous correlations across firms. The presence of time dependence in stock returns 
(Akgiray, 1989) and event-date clustering likely violate such assumptions in our research 
setting, thus resulting in biased coefficient estimates (Bernard 1987; Froot 1989; Kolari and 
Pynnonen 2010).  To use the Sefcik and Thompson methodology, we create fourteen-weighted 
portfolio returns, one for each firm characteristic and the intercept, which we subsequently use 
as the dependent variables in Equation 2. To create the weighted-portfolio of returns we create 
two matrices: Matrix R is a n x j matrix, where n is the number of trading days in our sample 
period and j the number of firms and Matrix F is a j x k matrix, where k consists of the thirteen 
different firm characteristics plus the intercept. Finally, the weighted-portfolio of returns is 
calculated as (F`F)-1F`R`.15 
 5.2 Sample and data 
We obtain data on bank characteristics from the FR-9YC reports from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago and market data from CRSP. In order to estimate Equation 1 we use 
all trading days available on CRSP from January 1st, 2005 to April 30th, 2005 for all bank 
holding companies for which we can retrieve data on repo transactions from the FR-9YC 
reports. Importantly, to apply the Sefcik and Thompson (1986)’s adjustment, we require banks 
to have data for all trading days in our sample period in CRSP. These data requirements give 
us a final sample of 36,818 firm-day observations for 449 unique bank holding companies16.  
5.3. Empirical Results 
We use Equation 1 to examine market reactions to the major congressional news events 
in Table 1 leading to the passage of the BAPCPA. Table 2 provides distributional statistics of 
the variables used in Equation 1which shows a mean RET of -0.1% over the sample period. 
                                                          
15 Further detail on this approach is provided in Sefcik and Thompson (1986) 
16 Prior to data refinement that is based on the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) adjustment we have 459 unique bank 
holding companies. Thus, the use of the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) adjustment leads to the loss of 10 banks. 
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The Pearson correlation matrix reported in Table 3 shows that variable EVENT_ALL is 
significantly negatively correlated with RET, which suggests that the finance risk factor may 
have dominated the finance cost factor. 
<<Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here>> 
  When we run Equation 1 for the 449 banks in our sample, in line with the results in 
Table 3, we find a statistically significant negative association between EVENT_ALL and RET. 
Specifically, column (1) in Table 4 shows that this association is significant at the 5% level. 
Given the wide scope of the sweeping changes brought about by the BAPCPA it is debatable 
to what extent such market reactions can be attributed to the provisions relating to repo 
agreements. To investigate the incremental effect having exposure to the repo market has on 
market reactions, we interact EVENT_ALL with REPO. Column (2) in Table 4 shows that the 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level suggesting that 
the incremental effect of having repo exposure is highly negative. Furthermore, given that the 
main effect is insignificantly different from zero, the results suggest that only firms which 
undertake repos experience a negative market reaction to news increasing the probability that 
the BAPCPA is enacted, further suggesting that our results are driven by banks having exposure 
to the repo market. 
When interpreting the results in the table, note that the single-event results reflect an 
average return during the event window. The overall sample’s abnormal return can be obtained 
by multiplying each of these reported figures (i.e., the coefficients on  EVENT_ALL) by the 
number of days in the event window (three days in our study). Column (1) shows that banks 
experienced an average –0.12 percent cumulative abnormal return during each three-day event 
window. Moreover, column (2) suggests that banks with repo exposure experienced an average 
incremental negative  abnormal return of -0.42 percent during each three-day event window. 
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<<Insert Table 4 around here>> 
To address the concern that the observed market reactions are driven by aspects of the 
BAPCPA other than the extension of the repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions we undertake a cross 
sectional analysis where we control for firm specific characteristics. Table 5 shows 
distributional statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis (Equation 2). 68.6% 
of our sampled banks have repo exposure (REPO) while 11.6% undertake reverse repo 
transactions (REV_REPO). Our sampled banks have mean derivatives scaled by total assets 
(DERIV) of 12.3% and most of the loans are either loans secured by real estate (LOANS_REAL) 
or commercial and industrial loans (LOANS_COMM). Our proxy for securitization, SI is very 
small suggesting that most of our sampled banks do not undertake securitizations, while the 
mean CAPITAL_RATIO of our sampled banks is 13.9%. 
<<Insert Table 5 around here>> 
The correlation matrix reported in Table 6 suggests that REPO is positively correlated 
with REV_REPO suggesting that firms undertaking repo transactions tend to also undertake 
reverse repo transactions. Moreover, both MKT_VAL and DERIV are positively correlated with 
REPO suggesting that larger firms and firms with derivative exposure undertake repo 
transactions. Interestingly, Table 6 shows a strong negative correlation between REPO and 
CAPITAL_RATIO suggesting that banks with repo exposure are weaker than their peers. 
<<Insert Table 6 around here>> 
Results for the two-stage regression reported in panel A of Table 7 show a statistically 
significant negative association between REPO and the market reaction coefficient, BETA. This 
result buttresses our prior results and suggests that firms with repo exposure had a more 
negative market reaction than firms without repo exposure. Interestingly, we find a statistically 
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significant positive association between REV_REPO and BETA suggesting a positive market 
reaction for firms undertaking reverse repo transactions. This is possibly the result of the 
BAPCPA confirmation of the repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions, which enable providers of finance 
to the repo market exemptions from the normal bankruptcy procedures.  
These inferences are confirmed when we control for heteroscedasticity and residual 
cross-correlation by adjusting returns using the Sefcik-Thompson methodology. As shown in 
panel B of Table 7, the negative association between REPO and Adj_RET is statistically 
significant, further confirming that repo exposure is driving the observed negative returns 
around our event dates. Considering that the average value of BETA in our sample is -0.0004, 
the coefficient in Table 7 on the variable REPO shows that banks with repo exposure 
experienced a market reaction that is twice as negative as the market reaction of banks without 
repo exposure, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with estimates reported in Table 4. 
<<Insert Table 7 around here>> 
5.4  Robustness tests 
As previously discussed, the presence of time dependence in stock returns (Akgiray, 
1989) and the event-date clustering that occurs in our research setting likely result in the 
violation of the assumptions of homoscedasticity of residuals and the absence of 
contemporaneous correlations across firms on which the two-stage regression approach builds. 
Therefore, it is crucial for our study to correct for such biases. In the main analysis we used the 
Sefcik-Thompson methodology to correct for heteroscedasticity and residual cross-correlation, 
while in this section we explore alternative approaches to solve this issue and make sure that 
our results are not driven by specific research design choices. Specifically, to test for the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative approaches to correct for heteroscedasticity and cross-
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correlation we undertake the following three additional tests: 1) the Patell (1976) test, 2) the 
Boehmer et al. (1991) test, and 3) the Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) test. 
Patell (1976) proposes a test statistic where the event period abnormal returns are 
standardized by the standard deviation of the estimation period abnormal return. This test is 
immune to the way in which abnormal returns are distributed across event windows but it is 
prone to cross-sectional correlation and event induced volatility. The Boehmer et al. (1991) 
test, apart from being immune to the way in which abnormal returns are distributed across event 
windows also adjusts for serial correlation and event induced volatility. Indeed, the Boehmer 
et al. (1991) test has gained popularity over the Patell (1976) statistic because it has been found 
to be more robust with respect to possible volatility changes associated with the event. 
Nonetheless, a weakness of this test is that it doesn’t control for cross-sectional correlation. 
Finally, the Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) test is not only immune to the way in which abnormal 
returns are distributed over event windows, but it also adjusts for cross-sectional correlation. 
Specifically, Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) propose a new test statistic that modifies 
the Boehmer et al. (1991) t-statistic to take into account cross-correlation. Moreover, the Kolari 
and Pynnonen (2010) statistic is readily useable to test multiple-day cumulative abnormal 
returns.  
As evident from Table 8, our results are statistically significant on the event date 
irrespective of which test is used, suggesting that the documented negative reaction around the 
even date is not driven by bias arising from event date clustering and that it is robust to different 
methodologies used to correct for heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation. 




6. Information Asymmetry  
6.1 Variable measurement and research design 
In our second set of tests we analyze whether the ‘safe harbor’ provisions brought about 
by the BAPCPA caused an increase in market information asymmetry. To do so, we employ a 
difference-in-differences approach where the treatment group consists of banks involved in 
repo transactions while the control group consists of banks that did not engage in repo 
transactions at any point during the sample period. To increase the likelihood that the treatment 
is orthogonal with respect to the outcome variable, we identify as treated banks those banks 
that at the end of 2004 (i.e. before the adoption of the BAPCPA) used repo transactions and 
that continue to use repos throughout our sample period. Thus, our analysis compares changes 
in information asymmetry before and after the BAPCPA adoption for banks exposed to repo 
transactions vis-à-vis banks that did not engage in repo transactions. Specifically, we employ 
the following multivariate regression model: 
 
SPRiq+1 = β1 + β2POSTiq + β3TREATEDiq+ β4POSTiq*TREATEDiq + β5REV_REPOiq + 
β6MKT_VALiq + β7DERIViq + β8LOANS_REALi + β9LOANS_DEPi + β10LOANS_AGRICi + 
β11LOANS_COMMi + β12LOANS_INDi + β13LOANS_FOREIGNi + β14SIiq + β15NIiq + 
β16CAPITAL_RATIOiq + εiq                                                          
   (3) 
 
where SPR is the average bid-ask spread standardized by the average stock price. This measure 
is meant to proxy general equity market information asymmetry. SPR is computed quarterly 
and the estimation window runs from the quarter announcement date to the following quarter 
reporting date. POST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for observations after the 
BAPCPA was enacted and 0 otherwise, while TREATED is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the bank engaged in repo transactions before and after the BAPCPA was enacted 
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(treatment group) and 0 otherwise (the control group).17 Thus, the interaction term between 
TREATED and POST provides a formal test for our second research hypothesis and tests 
whether information asymmetry among investors increased for banks exposed to repo 
transactions when compared to banks that do not undertake repo agreements.  
 6.2 Sample and Data 
For our second set of analyses, we retrieve firm-quarter data from the FR-9YC reports 
for all bank holding companies with no missing data on repos for each quarter from 2004 to 
2006. Since the BAPCPA was signed into law on April 20, 2005 but most of its provisions took 
effect on October 17, 2005, bank behavior in the second and third quarter of 2005 could be 
influenced by both the bankruptcy regulations effective at the time and the bankruptcy 
provisions applicable ones the BAPCPA is effective. Given that these two quarters are likely 
to be noisy, to attain a cleaner identification strategy to enable us to better compare bank 
behavior post-BAPCPA to bank behavior pre-BAPCPA, we drop from this analysis these 
quarters. Thus, we define the pre-period as consisting of the five quarters starting in first quarter 
of 2004 and ending in the first quarter of 2005 and the post period as consisting of the five 
quarters starting in the fourth quarter of 2005 and ending in the fourth quarter of 2005.18 Next, 
we merge data with CRSP and compute average bid-ask spread for each quarter. The final 
sample for this analysis consists of 3,137 firm-quarter observations for 374 unique banks. 1,217 
firm-quarter observations are treated observations (i.e. banks with repo transactions at the end 
of 2004, and thereafter) and 1,920 are control observations (i.e. banks with no repo transactions 
throughout the sample period). 
                                                          
17 We recognize that due to limited data availability we are unable to control for the type of repo agreements the 
company engages into. As previously discussed it is only after ASU 2014-11 became effective in 2015, that 
companies were required to disclose detailed information about the type of repo agreements they engage in. 
18 Given that the choice of the beginning and end of sample period is ‘ad-hoc’ in robustness tests we test for the 
sensitivity of our results to this research design choice.  
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6.3 Empirical Results 
Table 9 shows distributional statistics for the variables used in Equation 3 (both for 
treated and control observations, in Panels A and B respectively) while Table 10 presents the 
Pearson correlation matrix for the variables of interest. As evident from Table 9, treated banks 
(i.e. banks undertaking repo transactions) are larger (mean MKT_VAL of 14.052 vs 12.196) and 
more profitable (mean NI of 0.007 vs 0.006) than banks which do not undertake repo 
agreements. In terms of capital ratios, the two groups of banks are quite similar (mean 
CAPITAL_RATIO of 13.108 vs 13.895). The correlation matrix shown in Table 10 suggests 
that larger banks and banks with better performance have lower information asymmetry as 
evident by the negative correlation of MKT_VAL and NI with SPR.  
<<Insert tables 9 and 10 around here>> 
Table 11 formally tests the existence of a parallel trend between treated and control banks 
in the pre-adoption period, which is one of the underlying assumptions of the difference-in-
differences model. To do so, we estimate model (3) by including interaction terms between the 
variable TREATED and dummy variables for each of the five pre-adoption periods (although 
not tabulated, interaction terms are also included for the post-period dummies). The existence 
of a parallel trend in the pre-adoption period requires that none of the interaction terms is 
statistically significant (we exclude the first interaction term and use it as benchmark group). 
Results reported in Table 11 support the existence of a parallel trend in the pre-adoption period 
as none of the interaction terms is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Having ascertained the existence of a parallel trend, Table 12 shows the results for 
Equation 3 where a differences-in-differences approach is used to analyze the effect of the 
BAPCPA on market information asymmetry. The coefficient of interest in Table 12 is the 
coefficient for POST*TREATED, which is statistically significantly positively associated with 
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SPR, suggesting that following the passage of the BAPCPA firms exposed to repo agreements 
experienced an increase in bid-ask spreads when compared to the control group. The coefficient 
reported for POST*TREATED in Table 12 shows that the increase in SPR after the passage of 
the BAPCPA is on average the 77 percent higher for banks exposed to repo agreements than 
for banks not exposed to repos.19  
<<Insert Table 12 around here>> 
6.3  Robustness tests 
In this section, we test whether our results are robust to changes in the empirical analysis. 
First, we investigate whether the documented increase in information asymmetry after the 
passage of the BAPCPA is sensitive to the number of quarters in the pre- and post-period used 
in the analysis. In Table 13, columns 1 and 2 we estimate Equation 3 using only four and three 
quarters in the pre- and post-period, respectively, and we document that our results are not 
sensitive to the choice of time window used in the analysis. In Table 13 column 3, we show the 
results when we adjust Equation 3 so that we control for bank size using the natural logarithm 
of total assets instead of market value, MKT_VAL. These, results are similar to those previously 
reported. Next, in column 4 we change the estimation model and we use a generalized linear 
model (GLM) in place of an OLS model to estimate Equation 3 to gain asymptotic efficiency 
and obtain similar results to those reported in the main analysis. Finally, in the last column of 
Table 13 we winsorize all variables at 5% instead of 1%, to make sure that outliers are not 
driving our results. As evident in Table 13, the interaction terms between POST and TREATED 
remains positive and statistically significant, thus corroborating the main findings. 
<<Insert Table 13 around here>> 
                                                          
19 The economic significance is calculated as the coefficient on the interaction term (0.0019) divided by the mean 
SPR for the sample (0.00248). 
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6.4 Further analyses 
As discussed previously a major change brought about by the passage of the BAPCPA 
was to extend repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions to repo agreements collateralized by mortgage-
backed securities. As banks with large holdings of mortgage backed securities are most likely 
to take advantage of the changes introduced by BAPCPA, as they can use such holdings as 
collateral in repo agreements, we expect companies with repo agreements and higher mortgage 
backed securities to experience higher information asymmetry following BAPCPA.  
To test our prediction, we construct a variable HIGH_MBS which is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 for banks with amortized cost of mortgage backed securities scaled by 
total assets20 above median and 0 otherwise. We interact this variable with the dummy variable 
indicating the period post the passage of BAPCPA (POST) and a dummy variable identifying 
treated banks (TREATED). As shown in Table 14, the two-way interaction between POST and 
TREATED remains positive and statistically significant and the three-way interaction 
(POST*TREATED*HIGH_MBS) is statistically significantly positively associated with SPR 
indicating that the higher the mortgage backed security holdings, the higher is the increase in 
information asymmetry among investors for banks with repo exposure after the passage of 
BAPCPA.  
<<Insert Table 14 around here>> 
Finally, we test whether empirical evidence supports our story that the widening of the 
repo ‘safe harbor’ provisions brought about by the BAPCPA incentivized banks to substitute 
long term stable financing with short term repo financing. Specifically, in this analysis we use 
                                                          
20 This is a rough proxy of total holdings of mortgaged backed securities since this variable is only based on 
recognised mortgage backed securities. Banks might have other such securities held as collateral on repo and 
similar arrangements with counterparties and which are not recognised in the financial statements. Unless 
otherwise specified, these might be rehypothecated in other repo agreements. Information about such collateral is 
not publicly available. 
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deposits as our proxy for long term stable financing and test whether the relative amount of 
short term repo financing when compared to deposits increased post BAPCPA. For this 
analysis, we only keep those observations for banks that increased repurchase agreements post-
BAPCPA.  
The results for this analysis are shown in Table 15 and the variable of interest is POST. 
The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on POST indicates whether the dependent 
variable has increased post BAPCPA. In model (1) of Table 15 we test whether the banks which 
increased the amount of repo agreements post BAPCPA also increased their deposits, where 
the variable DEPOSITS is calculated as total deposits scaled by total assets. In model (2) we 
test whether the relative amount of deposits to the sum of repo agreements and deposits has 
changed post-BAPCPA. To undertake the latter analysis, we construct a new variable 
DEPOSITS_REPO which is calculated as total deposits scaled by the sum of repo agreements 
and total deposits. Ex-ante we expect a statistically significant negative coefficient on POST 
for model (2) suggesting that the relative amount of deposits to repo agreements has decreased 
post-BAPCPA. Such a result would buttress our story that post-BAPCPA there was a shift from 
stable long-term financing to short term repo financing. All controls used in this analysis are 
as previously defined.  
<<Insert Table 15 around here>> 
As shown in Table 15 model (1), POST is positive and statistically significant 
suggesting that banks that increased repo agreements post-BAPCPA, also increased their 
deposits. More importantly in model (2), POST is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level of significance suggesting that the relative amount of deposits to the sum of deposits 
and repo agreements has decreased post-BAPCPA. Specifically, this result indicates that the 
rate of increase in repo financing was higher than the rate of increase in deposit financing post-
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BAPCPA. This result vindicates our story that there was a shift from long term deposit 
financing to short term repo financing.  
7.  Conclusion 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 
brought about significant changes to the US Bankruptcy Code. While some of these changes 
related to personal bankruptcy law, changes were also made to business bankruptcy law. 
Particularly, the BAPCPA extended the so-called ‘safe harbor’ provisions, which exempt repo 
agreements from the normal workings of the Bankruptcy Code to repo agreements 
collateralized by riskier collateral. In this regard, while prior to the BAPCPA repo agreements 
availing of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions had to be collateralized by US government backed 
securities, following the BAPCPA repo agreements collateralized by riskier collateral such as 
mortgage backed securities were eligible for ‘safe harbor’ provisions.  
While extending the preferential treatment afforded to repo agreements facilitates 
funding arrangements through this market, thus potentially reducing finance costs (finance cost 
factor), it potentially results in a substitution effect where stable long-term financing is 
substituted with runnable short-term financing (finance risk factor). While both factors were 
evident following the passage of the BAPCPA which factor dominates is an empirical question. 
To address this research question, we identify major congressional events related to the 
passage of the BACPCPA and calculate abnormal market reactions in the three-day event 
windows around these events. Results indicate that the perceived finance risk arising from this 
change offsets the effect of any reduction in finance costs. Moreover, subsequent cross-
sectional analysis indicates that such market reaction is at least partly driven by repo exposure. 
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Further, the undertaking of riskier repurchase transactions likely resulted in increased 
information asymmetry post-BAPCPA. Using a difference-in-differences approach, and 
measuring information asymmetry using the bid-ask spread, we find that firms which were 
exposed to repo agreements experienced increased information asymmetry following 
BAPCPA. Although the use of a difference-in-differences approach helps in mitigating 
endogeneity concerns, we acknowledge that our analysis lacks an ideal control group that 
would be made of US banks that are outside the scope of the BAPCPA.  
Finally, further linking our results to the BAPCPA, we find that information asymmetry 
among market participants increased for firms with repo agreements and above average 
mortgage backed securities post BAPCPA. This result is particularly interesting since repo 
agreements collateralized with mortgage backed securities were the major type of repo 
agreements for which ‘safe harbor’ provisions were extended.  
The unintended consequence of BAPCPA documented in this study is primarily driven 
by asynchronous changes in the bank regulatory framework. Specifically, in this case, it is the 
result of changes in bankruptcy legislation which are not accompanied by changes in 
accounting regulations requiring enhanced disclosures. This finding has significant policy 
implications since it suggests that policy makers need to account for how different regulations 
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Primary Dealers’ Outstanding Repos July 6, 1994 to July 22, 2009 
 
Figure 1: This figure shows the increase in repo agreements from July 6, 1994 to July 22, 2009. This figure is 
sourced from Adrian et al. (2009), Chart 1 in original, and a vertical line was added to show October 2005, the 






Overnight Repos as a Percentage of Total Primary Dealer Repo Financing January 5, 
2005 to July 22, 2009 
 
Figure 2: This figure shows the percentage of primary dealer overnight repo agreements as a percentage of total 
primary dealer repo agreements for the period January 5, 2005 to July 22, 2009. This figure is sourced from Adrian 
et al. (2009), Chart 2 in original, and a vertical line was added to show October 2005, the date the provisions of 






Prevalance of Less Liquid Collateral in Primary Dealers’ Repo Transactions January 5, 




Figure 3: This figure shows the prevalence of less liquid collateral (e.g. corporate securities and mortgage backed 
securities) for the period January 5, 2005 to July 22, 2009. This figure is sourced from Adrian et al. (2009), Chart 







News events leading to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
 
Date Details of event 
    
February 1, 2005 
Republican Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa (for himself together with seven original cosponsors) introduced S.256, the 
'Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005' in the Senate. 
February 9, 2005 
F. James Sensebrenner Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary (for himself together with 60 original 
cosponsors) introduced legislation identical to S.256 in the House of Representatives (H.R. 685). 
March 10, 2005 Passed/ agreed to in Senate with 74 votes in favour and 25 against. Record Vote No.: 44 
April 14, 2005 
The House of Representatives passed the bill (S.256) with 302 votes in favour and 126 against (Roll No. 108). The Bill was 
subsequently cleared for White House. 
April 20, 2005 Bill signed by President and became Public Law No: 109-008 
 
Table 1:  A list of major congressional events leading to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Events sourced from 




Distributional statistics for the variables used in Equation 1 
 
Variable N p25 mean p50 p75 sd 
              
RET 36818 -0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.007 0.016 
MKT_RET 36818 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.007 
CHG_TREAS 36818 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 2: Distributional statistics for the variables used in Eq. 1. RET is the daily stock price return; MKT_RET is the CRSP equally-weighted daily return; CHG_TREAS is the 
daily change in the Barclays US treasury index and EVENT_ALL is an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 on the day preceding, the day of, and the day after the event 





Pearson correlation for variables used in Equation 1 
 
Variable RET MKT_RET CHG_TRES EVENT_ALL 
          
RET 1.000       
MKT_RET 0.293*** 1.000     
CHG_TREAS 0.022*** 0.099*** 1.000   
EVENT_ALL -0.016** -0.021*** 0.056*** 1.000 
         
Table 3: Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in Eq. 1. RET is the daily stock price return; MKT_RET is the CRSP equally-weighted daily return; CHG_TREAS is 
the daily change in the Barclays US treasury index and EVENT_ALL is an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 on the day preceding, the day of, and the day after the 
event dates listed in Table 1 (where days are defined as CRSP trading days). The sample period runs from January 1, 2005 to April 30, 2005. *, ** and *** denote significance 






Multivariate regression analyzing market reactions to news events leading to the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.  
 
    RET 
Variable   (1)  (2) 
          
MKT_RET   0.7079***   0.7079*** 
    [22.373]   [22.373] 
CHG_TREAS   -0.2664   -0.2664 
    [-1.414]   [-1.414] 
EVENT_ALL   -0.0004**   0.0005 
    [-2.375]   [1.597] 
EVENT _ALL* REPO       -0.0014*** 
        [-3.525] 
REPO       -0.0000 
        [-0.318] 
Constant   -0.0001*   -0.0001 
    [-1.680]   [-0.669] 
          
(EVENT_ALL + EVENT_ALL *REPO) = 0   F-test: 18.81 
        p-value < 0.01 
          
Observations   36,818   36,818 
No. of Banks   449   449 
R-squared   0.086   0.086 
         
         
Table 4: Regression (1) shows the results when running Equation 1 while regression (2) shows the results when 
Equation 1 is adjusted so as to include an interaction term between EVENT_ALL and REPO. RET is daily stock 
price return for firm i, MKT_RET is CRSP equally-weighted daily return, CHG_TREAS is the daily change in the 
Barclays US treasury index, and EVENT_ALL is an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 on the day 
preceding, the day of, and the day after the event dates listed in Table 1 (where days are defined as CRSP trading 
days). REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank entered in repo agreements during the 
sample period, 0 otherwise. The sample period runs from January 1, 2005 to April 30, 2005. *, ** and *** denote 






Distributional statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis 
Variable N p25 mean p50 p75 sd 
              
REPO 449 0.000 0.686 1.000 1.000 0.465 
REV_REPO 449 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.320 
MKT_VAL 449 11.379 12.622 12.212 13.446 1.684 
DERIV 449 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.028 0.575 
LOANS_REAL 449 0.409 0.496 0.507 0.600 0.149 
LOANS_DEP 449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
LOANS_AGRIC 449 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.011 
LOANS_COMM 449 0.056 0.101 0.089 0.135 0.064 
LOANS_IND 449 0.010 0.042 0.026 0.059 0.045 
LOANS_FOREIGN 449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI 449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NI 449 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 
CAPITAL_RATIO 449 11.780 13.895 12.980 14.810 3.313 
 
Table 5: Distributional statistics for the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis. REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank entered in repo 
agreements during the sample period, 0 otherwise. REV_REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank entered in reverse repo agreements during the sample 
period, 0 otherwise. MKT_VAL is the logarithm of market capitalization; DERIV is the amount of derivatives; LOANS_REAL is the amount of loans secured by real estate; 
LOANS_DEP is the amount of loans to depository institutions; LOANS_AGRIC is the amount of loans to finance agricultural production; LOANS_COMM is the amount of 
commercial and industrial loans; LOANS_IND is the amount of loans to individuals; LOANS_FOREIGN is the amount of loans to foreign governments; SI is securitization 
income; NI is net income; CAPITAL_RATIO is the bank’s capital ratio. All continuous variables with the exception of MKT_VAL and CAPITAL_RATIO are standardized by 





Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis 












FOREIGN SI NI 
                          
REPO 1.000                       
REV_REPO 0.140** 1.000                     
MKT_VAL 0.273*** 0.529*** 1.000                   
DERIV 0.113* 0.464*** 0.503*** 1.000                 
LOANS_REAL -0.168*** -0.274*** -0.422*** -0.300*** 1.000               
LOANS_DEP 0.058 0.226*** 0.248*** 0.283*** -0.045 1.000             
LOANS_AGRIC -0.042 -0.085 -0.088 -0.072 -0.081 -0.027 1.000           
LOANS_COMM 0.048 0.039 0.079 -0.061 -0.148** 0.090 0.144** 1.000         
LOANS_IND 0.128** 0.03 0.211*** 0.071 -0.301*** 0.005 0.03 0.019 1       
LOANS_FOREIGN 0.07 0.267*** 0.295*** 0.437*** -0.148** 0.218*** -0.061 0 0.082 1     
SI 0.01 0.255*** 0.341*** 0.482*** -0.209*** 0.100* -0.053 -0.065 0.189*** 0.269*** 1   
NI 0.033 0.158*** 0.433*** 0.113* -0.112* 0.069 0.000 0.085 0.082 -0.022 0.099* 1 
CAPITAL_RATIO -0.142** -0.016 -0.110* -0.054 -0.344*** -0.057 -0.067 -0.287*** -0.035 -0.054 0.056 -0.034 
 
Table 6: Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in model (2). REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank entered in repo agreements during 
the sample period, 0 otherwise. REV_REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank entered in reverse repo agreements during the sample period, 0 otherwise. 
MKT_VAL is the logarithm of market capitalization; DERIV is the amount of derivatives; LOANS_REAL is the amount of loans secured by real estate; LOANS_DEP is the 
amount of loans to depository institutions; LOANS_AGRIC is the amount of loans to finance agricultural production; LOANS_COMM is the amount of commercial and industrial 
loans; LOANS_IND is the amount of loans to individuals; LOANS_FOREIGN is the amount of loans to foreign governments; SI is securitization income; NI is net income; 
CAPITAL_RATIO is the bank’s capital ratio. All continuous variables with the exception of MKT_VAL and CAPITAL_RATIO are standardized by total assets and winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. All continuous variables are calculated as the mean values for the quarters ending December 31, 2014 and March 31, 2015.*, ** and *** denote 







Panel A: 2- Stage Regression   Panel B: Sefcik and Thompson Adjustment 
          
          
Variable BETA   Variable Adj_RET 
          
REPO -0.0008**   REPO -0.0008* 
  [-2.173]     [-1.776] 
REV_REPO 0.0013*   REV_REPO 0.0013 
  [1.960]     [1.565] 
MKT_VAL -0.0007*** MKT_VAL -0.0007 
  [-4.768]     [-1.580] 
DERIV 0.0008**   DERIV 0.0008* 
  [2.074]     [1.683] 
LOANS_REAL 0.0005   LOANS_REAL 0.0005 
  [0.326]     [0.265] 
LOANS_DEP -0.0053   LOANS_DEP -0.0053 
  [-0.036]     [-0.028] 
LOANS_AGRIC -0.0116   LOANS_AGRIC -0.0116 
  [-0.763]     [-0.615] 
LOANS_COMM 0.0032   LOANS_COMM 0.0032 
  [1.114]     [1.005] 
LOANS_IND 0.0003   LOANS_IND 0.0003 
  [0.063]     [0.052] 
LOANS_FOREIGN -0.7987   LOANS_FOREIGN -0.7987 
  [-0.467]     [-0.553] 
SI -3.0764   SI -3.0764 
  [-1.630]     [-1.542] 
NI 0.2114   NI 0.2114 
  [1.377]     [1.245] 
CAPITAL_RATIO -0.0000   CAPITAL_RATIO -0.0000 
  [-0.219]     [-0.182] 
Constant 0.0084*** Constant 0.0084 
  [3.042]     [1.429] 
          
Observations 449   Observations 82 
R-squared 0.104       
 
Table 7: Results for the cross-sectional analyses. Panel A, shows the results of the two-stage regression, while 
Panel B shows the results of the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) which controls for heteroscedasticity and residual 
cross-correlation. In Panel A we have one observation for each bank (449 banks), while due to the methodological 
requirements of the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) adjustment in Panel B we have one observation for each trading 
day in our sample period (82 days). REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank entered in 
repo agreements during the sample period, 0 otherwise. REV_REPO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
1 if the bank entered in reverse repo agreements during the sample period, 0 otherwise. MKT_VAL is the logarithm 
of market capitalization; DERIV is the amount of derivatives; LOANS_REAL is the amount of loans secured by real 
estate; LOANS_DEP is the amount of loans to depository institutions; LOANS_AGRIC is the amount of loans to finance 
agricultural production; LOANS_COMM is the amount of commercial and industrial loans; LOANS_IND is the amount of loans 
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to individuals; LOANS_FOREIGN is the amount of loans to foreign governments; SI is securitization income; NI is net 
income; CAPITAL_RATIO is the bank’s capital ratio. All continuous variables with the exception of MKT_VAL 
and CAPITAL_RATIO are standardized by total assets and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All continuous 
variables are calculated as the mean values for the quarters ending December 31, 2014 and March 31, 2015. *, ** 


















-1 -0.0012 *** **  
0 -0.0111 *** *** ** 
+1 0.0012     
Table 8: Results for the robustness tests on the event study. RET is the daily average return for sample banks 
on the day prior to the event (-1), the day of the event (0), and the day after the event (+1). *, ** and *** denote 




Distributional statistics of variables used in Equation 3 
Panel A: Treated group           
Variable N p25 mean p50 p75 sd 
SPR 1217 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
MKT_VAL 1217 12.892 14.052 13.787 14.913 1.606 
DERIV 1217 0.000 0.288 0.018 0.112 0.850 
LOANS_REAL 1217 0.366 0.441 0.458 0.532 0.143 
LOANS_DEP 1217 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 
LOANS_AGRIC 1217 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.010 
LOANS_COMM 1217 0.067 0.116 0.105 0.153 0.070 
LOANS_IND 1217 0.015 0.051 0.038 0.079 0.044 
LOANS_FOREIGN 1217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI 1217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NI 1217 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.004 
CAPITAL_RATIO 1217 11.610 13.108 12.510 13.980 2.323 
REV_REPO 1217 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.019 
              
Panel B: Control group           
Variable N p25 mean p50 p75 sd 
SPR 1920 0.003 0.010 0.007 0.015 0.009 
MKT_VAL 1920 11.426 12.196 11.934 12.718 1.140 
DERIV 1920 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.013 0.412 
LOANS_REAL 1920 0.426 0.528 0.533 0.631 0.142 
LOANS_DEP 1920 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
LOANS_AGRIC 1920 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.013 
LOANS_COMM 1920 0.056 0.098 0.086 0.127 0.060 
LOANS_IND 1920 0.011 0.037 0.024 0.048 0.039 
LOANS_FOREIGN 1920 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SI 1920 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NI 1920 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.004 
CAPITAL_RATIO 1920 11.680 13.895 12.915 14.860 3.596 
REV_REPO 1920 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.011 
Table 9: Distributional statistics for the variables used in Equation 3 for treated (Panel A) and control (Panel B) 
groups. SPR is the average bid-ask spread standardized by the average stock price; MKT_VAL is the logarithm of 
market capitalization; DERIV is the amount of derivatives ; LOANS_REAL is the amount of loans secured by real 
estate; LOANS_DEP is the amount of loans to depository institutions; LOANS_AGRIC is the amount of loans to 
finance agricultural production; LOANS_COMM is the amount of commercial and industrial loans; LOANS_IND 
is the amount of loans to individuals; LOANS_FOREIGN is the amount of loans to foreign governments; SI is 
securitization income; NI is net income; CAPITAL_RATIO is the bank’s capital ratio; REV_REPO is the amount 
of reverse repo agreements. All continuous variables with the exception of MKT_VAL and CAPITAL_RATIO are 
scaled by total assets. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are calculated quarterly 
for the five quarters 2004Q1 to 2005Q1 representing the period pre BAPCPA and the five quarters 2005Q4 to 





Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in Equation 3 
 
Table 10: Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in Equation 3. All variables defined as in Table 9. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level 
of significance respectively. 
 
 

















DERIV -0.177*** 0.509*** 1
LOANS_REAL 0.177*** -0.426*** -0.295*** 1
LOANS_DEP -0.132*** 0.226*** 0.230*** -0.142*** 1
LOANS_AGRIC 0.072*** -0.128*** -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.040* 1
LOANS_COMM -0.078*** 0.083*** -0.067*** -0.193*** 0.108*** 0.118*** 1
LOANS_IND -0.078*** 0.164*** 0.028 -0.231*** 0.017 0.034 0.004 1
LOANS_FOREIGN -0.114*** 0.307*** 0.407*** -0.143*** 0.153*** -0.049** 0.014 0.055** 1
SI -0.119*** 0.287*** 0.396*** -0.062*** 0.082*** -0.052** -0.026 0.007 0.173*** 1
NI -0.290*** 0.356*** 0.106*** -0.063*** 0.066*** -0.011 0.03 0.053** 0.048** 0.100*** 1
CAPITAL_RATIO 0.073*** -0.068*** -0.003 -0.309*** -0.023 -0.079*** -0.279*** -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.037* 0.02 1




Effect of BAPCPA on information asymmetry: Parallel trend assumption 
  SPR 
Dummy_2004q1 * TREATED // 
  // 
Dummy_2004q2 * TREATED 0.0001 
  [0.248] 
Dummy_2004q3 * TREATED 0.0001 
  [0.216] 
Dummy_2004q4 * TREATED 0.0007 
  [1.590] 
Dummy_2005q1 * TREATED -0.0002 
  [-0.311] 
    
  F-test: 1.75 
  p-value > 0.1 
    
Main effects included YES 
All controls YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES 
Observations 3,137 
 
Table 11: Results from testing the parallel trend assumption. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 















 Table 12 
Effect of BAPCPA on information asymmetry: Results from the diff-in-diff approach 
   (1) 
Variable SPR 
    
POST -0.0029*** 
  [-6.293] 
TREATED -0.0011 
  [-0.376] 
POST*TREATED 0.0019*** 
  [5.705] 
MKT_VAL -0.0037*** 
  [-5.499] 
DERIV 0.0002 
  [1.143] 
LOANS_REAL -0.0041 
  [-1.032] 
LOANS_DEP -0.0239 
  [-0.623] 
LOANS_AGRIC -0.0072 
  [-0.220] 
LOANS_COMM 0.0102* 
  [1.777] 
LOANS_IND 0.0119 
  [0.891] 
LOANS_FOREIGN -0.9937 
  [-1.231] 
SI 0.4731 
  [0.662] 
NI 0.0975** 
  [1.992] 
CAPITAL_RATIO -0.0002** 
  [-2.471] 
REV_REPO 0.0051 
  [0.304] 
Constant 0.0691*** 
  [5.586] 
    
Quarter Fixed Effects YES 




Table 12: Results for the information asymmetry models. All variables defined as in Table 9. *, ** and *** denote 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  SPR SPR SPR SPR SPR 
Variable 
Only 4 quarters 
pre and post 
Only 3 quarters 
pre and post 
Controlling for 





            
POST -0.0031*** -0.0020*** -0.0018*** -0.0039*** -0.0024*** 
  [-6.470] [-4.514] [-4.412] [-8.071] [-6.931] 
TREATED -0.0027 0.0088* 0.0029** 0.0044* -0.0015 
  [-0.472] [1.792] [2.060] [1.664] [-0.674] 
POST*TREATED 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0015*** 
  [5.270] [4.408] [5.481] [6.102] [5.363] 
Constant 0.0610*** 0.0404*** 0.0747*** 0.0577*** 0.0668*** 
  [4.765] [4.314] [5.126] [7.294] [6.577] 
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,557 1,886 3,173 3,137 3,137 
R-squared 0.877 0.893 0.862 // 0.896 
Table 13: Robustness tests for results for the information asymmetry model. All variables defined as in Table 9. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust t-statistics 




Effect of increase in repo and high MBS on information asymmetry 
  (1) 
Variable SPR 
    
POST -0.0027*** 
  [-5.885] 
TREATED -0.0112** 
  [-2.505] 
POST*TREATED*HIGH_MBS 0.0007* 
  [1.839] 
POST*TREATED 0.0016*** 
  [4.788] 
HIGH_MBS 0.0011** 
  [2.920] 
POST*HIGH_MBS -0.0000 
  [-0.104] 
TREATED*HIGH_MBS -0.0015*** 
  [-4.237] 
MKT_VAL -0.0035*** 
  [-6.107] 
DERIV 0.0001 
  [1.065] 
LOANS_REAL -0.0113*** 
  [-5.192] 
LOANS_DEP -0.0080 
  [-0.226] 
LOANS_AGRIC -0.0206 
  [-0.828] 
LOANS_COMM 0.0243** 
  [2.462] 
LOANS_IND 0.0062 
  [0.742] 
LOANS_FOREIGN -0.9162 
  [-1.780] 
SI 0.4340 
  [1.034] 
NI 0.0705 
  [0.937] 
CAPITAL_RATIO -0.0002*** 
  [-3.384] 
REV_REPO 0.0043 
  [0.238] 
Constant 0.0750*** 
  [10.566] 
    
Quarter Fixed Effects YES 





Table 14: Results for the information asymmetry model when we control for mortgage backed securities (MBS) 
holdings. HIGH_MBS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the amortized cost of mortgage backed 
securities is above mean, 0 otherwise. All other variables defined as in Table 9. *, ** and *** denote significance 






Repos vs Deposits in the Post-Period 




      
POST 0.0078* -0.0066*** 
  [2.067] [-3.915] 
MKT_VAL -0.0331*** -0.0149*** 
  [-5.440] [-5.470] 
DERIV -0.0112** -0.0109*** 
  [-2.338] [-3.888] 
LOANS_REAL 0.1354*** 0.0704*** 
  [5.508] [3.857] 
LOANS_DEP 3.5419** 3.5678*** 
  [2.809] [3.744] 
LOANS_AGRIC 0.4034 0.0303 
  [1.297] [0.142] 
LOANS_COMM 0.0480 0.0733** 
  [0.754] [2.278] 
LOANS_IND 0.1839 0.1102*** 
  [1.774] [3.675] 
LOANS_FOREIGN 30.7643** 45.3688*** 
  [2.326] [5.888] 
SI -31.8133** -16.9241*** 
  [-2.465] [-3.601] 
NI 0.3250 -0.3754 
  [0.469] [-1.656] 
CAPITAL_RATIO -0.0018 0.0009** 
  [-1.322] [2.538] 
REV_REPO 0.5490*** 0.0912 
  [3.306] [0.400] 
      
Quarter Fixed Effects YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 1,458 1,458 
R-squared 0.939 0.964 
 
Table 15: Results for the substitution effect between repos and deposits post-BAPCA. For this analysis our sample 
consists of only those banks which increased their repo agreements post-BAPCPA. In regression (1) the dependent 
variable is the amount of deposits standardized by total assets while in regression (2) the dependent variable is the 
amount of deposit over the sum of deposits and repos. POST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
the period 2005q4 – 2006q4 and 0 for the period 2004q1-2005q1. All other variables defined as in Table 9. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust t-statistics shown 
in brackets. 
